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Fox: Curran v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co.

RECENT CASES
INSURANCE LAW-UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
VALIDITY OF OTHER INSURANCE PROVISIONS
Curran v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33,
266 N.E. 2d 566 (1971).

T

to the Ohio Supreme Court on an appeal from two
separate actions heard by the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County
and consolidated therein because of their identical legal issues.
HIS CASE CAME

In the first case, plaintiff-appellee sustained personal injuries when
the car in which she was riding as a passenger was involved in a collision
resulting from the negligent operation of another car by an uninsured
motorist. The owner of the car in which the plaintiff-appellee was riding
was insured under a policy of insurance which provided uninsured
motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000 for injury to one person and
$20,000 for injuries to two or more persons injured in the same accident.
Plaintiff-appellee was one of five passengers who subsequently shared in
the $20,000 of insurance proceeds under this policy. At the time of the
collision, plaintiff-appellee had in force an auto insurance policy issued by
the defendant-appellant, which also provided for uninsured motorist
coverage to plaintiff-appellee and in the same amounts as the driver's
policy. Plaintiff-appellee filed an action in declaratory judgment against
defendant-appellant seeking a ruling as to whether she was entitled to
collect from her insurer under the uninsured motorist clause of her policy.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the
plaintiff-appellee was entitled to collect from her insurer the difference
between either the smaller of her full damages or the policy limit for
a single injury ($10,000), and the amount received under the driver's
policy of insurance.
The second case also involved a collision of a car in which the
plaintiff-appellee was a passenger with another vehicle negligently
operated by an uninsured motorist. As in the first case, plaintiff-appellee
recovered from her driver's insurer under the driver's uninsured motorist
provision and sought recovery under her own policy of insurance which
included a provision for uninsured motorist coverage. The Court of
Appeals, in holding for plaintiff-appellee, reversed the lower court which
had granted the insurer a summary judgment.
It was the contention of the defendant-appellant insurers that their
liability was limited in both instances by the "other insurance" provisions
of their respective policies. These provisions were both "excess insurance"
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clauses.1 The Ohio Supreme Court, in ruling upon what it considered
to be the sole issue in this case, denied effectiveness to these clauses.
In holding for the plaintiff-appellees the Court stated:
... where an insurer provides uninsured motorist protection, as
required by R.C. 3937.18, it may not avoid indemnification of its
insured under that coverage by including in the insurance contract an
"other insurance" clause, which, if applied, would relieve the insurer
from liability in circumstances where the insured has other similar2
insurance available to him from which he could be indemnified.
As noted in the Court's opinion, although this is the first instance in
which the Ohio Supreme Court has passed on this question, the question
is not a novel one elsewhere. Of nineteen states which have ruled on this
question of law, twelve has given effect to these clauses and seven have
denied their validity.3 The argument used by those courts which give
effect to these clauses is that the Uninsured Motorist Statute was not
designed to provide a means by which the insured would obtain greater
insurance protection if injured by an uninsured driver than he would if
injured by a person having a policy containing the minimum required
statutory limits under the Financial Responsibility Statute. 4 Those states
denying validity offer several reasons, among which are the following:
(1) To give effect to such offsetting clauses would result in no
coverage at all, where both policies contain "other insurance"
clauses.
(2) Insurers may not, after accepting premiums for uninsured
motorist coverage, deny coverage on the ground that the
insured had other coverage available to him. 6
(3)

with the statutory
Such unilateral escape clauses are in conflict
7
purpose of the uninsured motorist statutes.

"Other insurance" provisions vary from policy to policy. They generally are one of
three types of clauses: "pro-rata," "excess insurance," or "excess-escape." A
"pro-rata" clause provides that where there is similar insurance available to the
insured, the policy will provide pro-rata coverage in conjunction with such insurance.
If a policy contains an "excess-escape" clause there will be no coverage provided
thereunder where other similar insurance is available to the insured. Where a policy
contains an "excess insurance" clause, the insurer will only pay to the insured that
amount by which its policy limit exceeds the policy limits of the other similar
insurance, up to the amount of actual damages.
2 Curran v. State Automobile Mud. Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 2d 33, 35, 266 N.E. 2d 566,
569 (1971).

3 For a good treatment of this subject including case citations, see 28 A.L.R. 3rd. 551.
4 M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W. 2d 742, 744 (1968).
5 Smith v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 171, 400 P. 2d 512, 514 (1965).
6 Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., Fla., 185 So. 2d 689, 690 (1966).
7 Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 396, 241 A. 2d 112, 116
(1968).
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The Ohio Supreme Court, although noting the elements of the first two
arguments stated above, adopted the third unequivocably when it stated:
To permit an insurer, who provides uninsured motorist coverage, to
avoid liability by an "other insurance" clause in cases where other
insurance is available to his insured would thwart... legislative
intent .... R.C. 3937.18 itself indicates that uninsured motorist
coverage is "for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators
of uninsured motor vehicles."
Aside from the fact that the instant case settles one important legal
issue as to uninsured motorist insurance coverage, it also is an indication
of a much broader policy decision on the part of the court as to the future
interpretation of Ohio's Uninsured Motorist Statute. The remainder of this
article is an attempt to illustrate one possible extension of this policy.
The question might be raised as to whether one could recover under
a provision for uninsured motorist coverage where the tortfeasor is
carrying a policy of bodily injury liability insurance. It is entirely possible
that the tortfeasor could be carrying bodily injury liability insurance in
amounts sufficient to satisfy the State's Financial Responsibility Act
and, because of multiple injuries, still be "partially insured" as to parties
injured by his negligent actions. 9 Based upon the liberal construction
given the Uninsured Motorist Statute by the Court in Curran, it would
appear that such a finding is entirely possible, if not probable.
Assuming that the courts will permit recovery, the amount of such
recovery will depend directly on how far future courts will be willing
to extend the rationale of the Curran decision in interpreting Ohio's
Uninsured Motorist Statute.
On October 1, 1970, Ohio's Uninsured Motorist Statute was amended
in part and the following provision was incorporated therein:
(c) In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this section and subject to the terms and conditions of
such coverage, the insurer making such payment to the extent
thereof is entitled to the proceeds of any settlement or judgment
resulting from the exercise of any rights of recovery of such
person against any person or organization legally responsible
for the bodily injury for which such payment is made ....
10
8Supra, note 2 at 38.
9 In Porter v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 12 Ariz. App. 2, 467 P. 2d 77,
80 (1970), the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted this rationale and went on to say:
In keeping with the strong policy ...of the Financial Responsibility Act, we are

of the opinion that [the insured] must be permitted to proceed against his
uninsured motorist carrier for his unsatisfied damages, at least until he has
received the minimum protection afforded by statute. Whether or not involved
in an accident with multiple injured parties, all victims of automobile accidents
should be assured of at least the statutory minimum level of protection.

10Ohio Rev. Code 3937.18(c).
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At first glance, this statutory provision seems to provide that in the event
the injured party should collect from his insurer under the uninsured
motorist provision, that insurer will be entitled to be subrogated to all
rights of the insured as to proceeds received from the tortfeasor. This
is based on the premise that there should not be a double recovery for
the same damage sustained as a result of the same accident.
Although such a purpose is based upon sound equitable principles, a
strict interpretation of the statute could well bring about an inequitable
result as illustrated by the following example: In an accident involving
multiple injured parties the tortfeasor has the statutory $12,50011
$25,000 coverage required by the Financial Responsibility Act, but
because there are multiple injured parties, our insured recovers only
$5,000 from the tortfeasor's insurer, although recovering a judgment
for $15,000. At the time of the collision, our insured had a policy with an
uninsured motorist coverage provision in the amount of $10,000 and
subject to an "other insurance" clause. Three different amounts of
recovery are possible.
(1) If the court gives a liberal construction of Ohio's Uninsured
Motorist Statute and stresses the rationale of making the injured party
whole, the insured should recover the full amount of his policy, ($10,000)
in addition to the $5,000 already received, or $15,000;
(2) If the court chooses to follow a middle-of-the-road approach,
12
and limits recovery to the statutory amount, the insured would recover
$7,500 from his insurer in addition to the $5,000 already received
or $12,500;
(3) If the court reads Ohio Revised Code section 3937.18(c)
strictly, the insured would recover the $10,000 policy limit, but because
of the subrogation feature, the total recovery ($15,000) would be
reduced by the $5,000 received from the tortfeasor's insurer on behalf
of the tortfeasor, and thus the insured will recover only $10,000 and
his insurer will only have paid out $5,000.
Interpreting Ohio Revised Code section 3937.18(c) in such a way as
not to reduce coverage to persons injured through the acts of uninsured
motorists below the amount of uninsured damages sustained, seems to be
in line with the following language of the Court in the Curran case:
...we are of the opinion that the uninsured motorist statute should
be construed liberally in order to effectuate the legislative purpose
that coverage be provided to persons injured through the acts of
uninsured motorists.'3 (Emphasis added).

11 Ohio's Financial Responsibility Act (O.R.C.

4509.01 et seq) specifies minimum
coverage for bodily injury liability insurance of $12,500-$25.000.
12 Id.

13 Supra, note 8.
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If, indeed, courts should construe the Uninsured Motorist Statute
liberally, it would seem to follow that in an effort to secure protection
for persons injured by the partially insured tortfeasor, the courts
would permit recovery by the insured from his own insurer to the
extent of the uninsured portion of his damages.
In making its decision in Curran, the court has painted the barn
with a wide brush. In so doing, it has noticeably left out some trimming
as stated above. In addition, it may have covered more than it wished. By
denying effectiveness to the broad category of "other insurance" clauses,
it has invalidated not only the type of provisions found in this case, but
also other types of "other insurance" clauses such as the "pro-rata"
clause which may or may not be repugnant to the statutory scheme of
uninsured motorist protection. What the insured has contracted for and
is relying upon is uninsured motorist coverage in a certain amount. It is
questionable whether Ohio's Uninsured Motorist Statute would dictate a
greater recovery; but, in view of the Curran decision, future courts would
have a sound basis upon which to permit such a recovery.
DENNIS J. Fox
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